## AC

Rehab is inevitable. Absent Pell Grants, it will be religious rehab which non-uniques disads but doesn’t solve crime. **Lockard 12**[[1]](#footnote-1)

This is a world to which the recently deceased Charles Colson contributed greatly, one where true knowledge comes from the bible, the Book of Mormon, and a few other holy texts. The awards dinner featured a solid contingent of Colson’s Prison Fellowship volunteers. Organized religious missions have been coming to prisons since the late eighteenth century, when the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Prisonssent mostly Quaker volunteers to Walnut Street Jail. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century US **prisons were sites of religious predation**, primarily led by Christian evangelicals. Limited efforts at educational modernization through **secular** post-secondary academic **programs came to a halt with the** 1994 **ban on Pell grants** for prisoners, legislation that had profoundly counter-productive effects. Colson’s growing success at **prison evangelization** programs **coincided with** the **gutting of higher education** opportunities in prisons. But despite enjoying a law career based on the advantages of an Ivy League undergraduate education, Colson disliked higher education as a diversion from spiritual pursuits. He had no use for contemporary intellectual debates, dismissing them as “the big lie of post-modernism” that distracted from rock-solid faith in Jesus as savior. In God and Government, Colson attacked the Enlightenment as a source of a mistaken understanding of human nature that led to a disastrous pursuit of social utopianism. He denounced universities as centers of moral relativism unfit to educate students who needed guidance toward moral authority. Colson’s vision of prison ministries corresponded with what he believed lacking from secular education – a Christ-centered path to improvement of self and society. Although he adopted the language of marginalization and oppression in describing prison inmates, Colson believed that address to the social origins of crime lay in spirituality rather than education that addressed the material world. Nowhere in his extensive writings does Colson engage with Pell grants and the disappearance of higher education from prisons. The politics that Colson advocated remained as deeply reactionary after his prison sentence as before. Rather, his experience combined with a new Christian evangelism added a coloration of social care that had been absent. His very popular and much-reprinted autobiography, Born Again, is filled with recounted political dialogue in White House offices and details of conversion and Christian fellowship found among Washington insiders. He views himself as an instrument in the Lord’s hands, unconscious before his downfall and conscious afterwards. “What happened in court today,” he said to the press after sentencing, “was the court’s will and the Lord’s will—I have committed my life to Jesus Christ and I can work for Him in prison as well as out.” The state, its institutions, and legal decisions in Colson’s view coincided with and remained subordinate to his own interpretation of Christian redemption. Born Again contains no condemnation of the lack of fellowship in Nixon’s racist Southern strategy, and has only praise for his president’s decision to bomb North Vietnam and prosecute the US genocide in south-east Asia. Ironically, it was the illegality of Colson’s obstruction of justice concerning a conspiracy against Daniel Ellsberg for his Pentagon Papers revelations about Vietnam that led to a seven-month prison sentence. In Colson’s version of his life story, his mistake lay in the hubris of ignoring God while in the White House. The rest of his life was repentance and corrective spiritual action, which he construed to include anti-Darwinism, opposition to gay and lesbian rights, and an array of reactionary causes. Another reading of Colson’s life is that he remained a faithful servant of the state, one who successfully advocated spiritual submission for prisoners rather than an education that would enable them to critique society more acutely and pursue intellectual self-reliance. The Prison Fellowship Ministries collaborate with prison administrations to operate a private-public partnership for obscurantism by missionizing a captive population. Such work with a domestic underclass recapitulates historic Euro-american imperialism’s combination of state and religious power to produce passive laboring subjects. The carceral state values narratives that confess sin, embrace salvational repentance, and advocate compliance with an ordained social order. Such narratives gain official sanction because, as Tanya Erzen argues, “Personal narratives of individual transformation are central to testimonial politics, and they work in conjunction with a neoliberal vision in which social services are privatized rather than funded by the federal government…Testimonial politics support the **faith-based policies** of economic privatization that **place the onus for solving social problems on the individual and** on the power of God to transform lives.” Colson modeled the compliant subject, entirely unlike the resistant prison narratives of Jimmy Santiago Baca. For Colson, a prisoner needed to learn social conformity alongside Christian submission. Prison was a place to ask questions only of oneself, not about society. Colson **did not challenge the massive growth of US prisons** since he served time in the 1970s or the role of the drug wars in fueling that growth. The entanglement of state and religion that Colson pursued resulted in a 2007 Eighth Circuit decision,Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, which sustained a lower court decision striking down a state-funded Fellowship-run InnerChange Freedom Initiative re-entry program in Iowa prisons that employed Bible counselors and evangelical Christian programming. Although the Iowa program no longer exists, it still functions in Minnesota and Texas. Colson’s efforts to foster Christian evangelism on taxpayer money, a clear breach of the Establishment Clause, are withering. Where he has succeeded is in bringing volunteers into prisons to do the same work free of charge, where they preach personal faith instead of educate. There are social costs in ignoring the profoundly life-altering potential of higher education. Colson’s post-Watergate career was dedicated to a blinkered Bible-centered vision of salvation and individual transformation in prisons, a vision that attached no importance to a broad humanities and sciences education. It is a legacy that needs undoing.

**Thus the Plan**: The USFG ought to grant access to Pell Grants to inmates in the United States criminal justice system.

Funding through normal means. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until she checks in CX. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows her to moot the AC.

Advantage 1 is Crime

Pell Grants rehabilitate prisoners which solves crime and poverty. Empirics prove. **Buzzini 9**[[2]](#footnote-2)

[Brackets in original text] It’s no secret that the education system in the United States is in shambles – and not just for inmates. Students aren’t receiving a proper education, which encourages the nation’s youth to get involved in gangs, drugs, and violence. **Many inmates can’t** even **read well, ranking** in **at** “maybe a **seventh-grade level**” (Leder 1). **Were it possible** for inmates **to receive a**n education while serving time (a GED if an equivalent had not been attained, followed by a post-secondary **degree**) **they would have a much greater chance of escaping** the clutches of **poverty and** their ties to **illegal activity when** they are **released** back into society. This must have been the line of thinking that inspired the inception of the first post-secondary correctional education program, which began in 1953 at the University of Southern Illinois in Menard. Such a program must have been a bit ahead of its time, because **by 1965 only 11** more post-secondary correctional **education** (PCSE) **programs appeared.** 19**65** was a landmark year for PCSE it **marked the first** time that inmates were eligible to receive **Pell Grants** to fund their college aspirations. **Thanks to** the availability of **federal funding, programs began popping up nationwide.** In 1973 there were 182 programs; by 1982 there were 350. Programs reached their peak when, **in the** early 19**90s, there were** a total of **772** on-site college programs **in 1,287 prisons** (Taylor “Pell Grants” 2). **The majority of inmates covered their costs with** the aid of **the Pell Grant. However, in** 19**94, thanks to** the prevailing **“tough on crime” attitude** of the time, **inmates** were **no longer** able to **receive** federal aid in the form of **Pell Grants.** While peak enrollment in PCSE programs totaled at 12 percent of inmate populations, the s0-called “deteriorated state” counted less than 4 percent (Taylor “Pell Grants” 3). There is **myriad statistical data** to **show that education programs** inside prisons **aid in** actual **rehab**ilitation **and** do **reduce recidivism** rates. But these facts were glossed over as politicians wowed their constituents with their tough policies regarding crime. However, they didn’t bother to mention to their constituents that “**Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York** are among the states [that **reported**] **reductions in recidivism of** as high as **15.5 percent for inmates** who participated **in education programs** (Freedman 6).” That 15.5 percent reduction means 15.5 percent of inmates were *actually* rehabilitated, as opposed to merely punished, during their time on the inside. The numbers are even more impressive on a national scale, as “**inmates with** at least two years of **college had a 10 percent re-arrest rate; the national average is 60 percent**” (“Statehouses Debate…”). That means 50 percent less people went back to prison, simply because they completed some form of higher education. It is for reasons such as this that “critics lament the loss of **Pell Grants** as short-sighted in light of studies documenting **lower recidivism** and misconduct rates among inmates who pursue post-secondary education” (Freedman 8). It truly is a serious loss, for the depletion of funding via Pell Grants for PSCE has resulted in a devastating loss of programs nationwide, despite such programs’ ability to reduce recidivism **and** markedly **rehabilitate** many **inmates who participate.** Should the Pell Grant be re-instated, corrections in America would see a much-needed turn for the better.

Poverty causes nuclear war. **Caldwell 03**[[3]](#footnote-3)

It would appear that global nuclear war will happen very soon, for two main reasons, alluded to above. First, human poverty and misery are [is] increasing at an incredible rate. There are now three billion more desperately poor people on the planet than there were just forty years ago. **Despite decades of industrial development, the number of** wretchedly **poor people continues to soar.** The pressure for war mounts as the population explodes. Second, **war is motivated by** resource scarcity -- **the desire of one group to acquire the land, water, energy, or other resources possessed by another.** **With each passing year, crowding and misery increase, raising the motivation for war to higher levels.**

Crime kills soft power. **Falk 12**[[4]](#footnote-4)

This unabashed avowal of imperial goals is the main thesis of the article, perhaps most graphically expressed in the following words: "The United States can increase the effectiveness of its military forces and make the world safe for soft power, America's inherent comparative advantage." As the glove fits the hand, **soft power** complements hard power within the wider enterprise of transforming the world in the United States' image, or at least in the ideal version of the United States' sense of self.

The authors acknowledge (rather parenthetically) that their strategy **may not work if the US continues** much longer **to be seen unfavourably abroad as a national abode of** drugs, **crime, [and] violence**, fiscal irresponsibility, family breakdown, and political gridlock. **They make a** rather meaningless **plea to restore "a** **healthy democracy" at home as a prelude to** the heavy lifting of **democratising the world, but they** do not pretend medical knowledge, and **offer no prescriptions for restoring the health of the American body politic.** And now, 16 years after their article appeared, it would appear that the adage, "disease unknown, cure unknown", applies.

Soft power solves multiple scenarios for extinction. **Nye and Armitage 07**[[5]](#footnote-5)

Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. **If a** people or **nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead** without using threats and bribes. **Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to**—and the costs of—**using hard power when the situation demands.** Appealing to others’ values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction…The information age has heightened political consciousness, but also made political groupings less cohesive. Small, adaptable, transnational networks have access to tools of destruction that are increasingly cheap, easy to conceal, and more readily available. Although the integration of the global economy has brought tremendous benefits, **threats such as pandemic disease and the collapse of financial markets are more distributed and more likely to arise without warning. The threat of** widespread physical harm to the planet posed by **nuclear catastrophe** has existed for half a century, though the realization of the threat **will become more likely as the number of nuclear weapons states increases.** The potential security challenges posed by **climate change raise[s]** the possibility of an entirely **new** set of **threats** for the United States **to consider**… **States** and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw in allies will gain competitive advantages in today’s environment. Those **who alienate potential friends will stand at greater risk.** China has invested in its soft power to ensure access to resources and to ensure against efforts to undermine its military modernization. **Terrorists depend on** their ability to attract **support from the crowd** at least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[7]](#footnote-7) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked.

Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Cost-benefit analysis is feasible. Ignore any util calc indicts. **Hardin 90** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

The standard is maximizing happiness. 6 reasons.

First is Doxastic Determinism.

Belief formation is not voluntary. We have no freedom over our long-term beliefs. **Alston 89**[[9]](#footnote-9)

Let's turn now to a critical examination of the basic control thesis, the thesis that one can take up at will whatever prepositional attitude one chooses. Those who have attacked this view are divided between those who hold that believing at will is logically impossible and those who hold that it is only psychologically impossible, a capacity that we in fact lack though one we conceivably could have had.16 I cannot see any sufficient reasons for the stronger claim, and so I shall merely contend that we are not so constituted as to be able to take up propositional attitudes at will. My argument for this, if it can be called that, simply consists in asking you to consider whether you have any such powers. **Can you**, at this moment, start to **believe that the U**nited **S**tates **is still a colony of Great Britain, just by deciding to** do so**? If you find it too incredible** that you should be sufficiently motivated **to** try to **believe this, suppose that someone offers you $500,000,000 to believe it**, and you are much more interested in the money than in believing the truth. Could you do what it takes to get that reward? Remember that we are speaking about believing at will. No doubt, there are things you could do that would increase the probability of your coming to believe this, but that will be discussed later. Can you switch propositional attitudes toward that proposition just by deciding to do so? **It seems clear** to me **that I have no such power.** Volitions, decisions, or choosings don't hook up with anything in the way of propositional attitude inauguration, just as they don't hook up with the secretion of gastric juices or cell metabolism. There could conceivably be individual differences in this regard. Some people can move their ears at will, while most of us cannot. However, I very much doubt that any human beings are endowed with the power of taking on propositional attitudes at will. The temptation to suppose otherwise may stem from conflating that power with others that we undoubtedly do have but that are clearly distinct. If I were to set out to bring myself into a state of belief that p, just by an act of will, I might assert that p with an expression of conviction, or dwell favorably on the idea that p, or imagine a sentence expressing p emblazoned in the heavens with an angelic chorus in the background intoning the Kyrie of Mozart's Coronation Mass. All this I can do at will, but none of this amounts to taking on a belief that p. It is all show, an elaborate pretence of believing. Having gone through all this, my doxastic attitudes will remain just as they were before; or if there is some change, it will be a result of these gyrations. We should not suppose that our inability to believe at will is restricted to propositions that are obviously false. The inability also extends, at least, to those that are obviously true. A few pages back we made the point that voluntary control attaches to contrary pairs, or to more complex arrays of alternatives. If the sphere of my effective voluntary control does not extend both to A and to not-A, then it attaches to neither. If I don't have the power to choose between A and not-A, then we are without sufficient reason to say that I did A at will, rather than just doing A, accompanied by a volition. It is even more obvious, if possible, that responsibility, obligation, and their kindred attach to doing A only if the agent has an effective choice between doing and not doing A. If I would still have done A whatever I willed, chose, or preferred, I can hardly be blamed for doing it. Thus, even if I willingly, or not unwillingly, form, for instance, perceptual beliefs in the way I do, it by no means follows that I form those beliefs at will, or that I have voluntary control over such belief formation, or that I can be held responsible or blameworthy for doing so. **It would have to be true that I have** effective voluntary **control over whether I** do or do not **believe that the tree has leaves** on it **when I see a tree with leaves on it** just before me **in broad daylight** with my eyesight working perfectly. And it is perfectly clear that in this situation I have no power at all to refrain from that belief. And so with everything else that seems perfectly obvious to us. **We have just as little voluntary control over ordinary belief formed by introspection**, memory, and simple uncontroversial inferences.

Doxastic unfreedom undermines deontology and justifies util. **Petersen 11**[[10]](#footnote-10)

These problems should sound like special cases of more general problems in the intersection of action theory and normative ethics. **Is responsible choice in intention** what is **essential** to positive evaluation**? Is there** such a thing as a **choice for which we can be** (truly) **responsible in the ﬁrst place? The Kantian** deontologist **must answer both** of these **positively, but** the **util**itarian **need not.** This is especially good for the epistemic utilitarian, since the conceptual coherence of free will faces tougher challenges than usual at the doxastic level.14 Traditional libertarian views will ascribe some separate form of causation to agents from the natural causation to which we are accustomed, and as applied in epistemology this mysterious causation would foreclose on any scientiﬁc account of how we form beliefs. It is far too early in the science side of the game for such foreclosures, and indeed given how far the science already has come, such foreclosures would look entirely arbitrary.15 It is possible a compatibilist version of doxastic voluntarism would be sufficient for Kantian epistemic responsibility, but compatibilism, too, has worse than usual problems at the cognitive level. If we explain epistemic agency in terms of causal processes, our inclination to epistemic blame is even more likely to balk than in the ordinary action cases. A compatibilist approach to epistemic agency will require a close look at the **causal mechanisms** at the sub-propositional level that underwrite the formation **of belief**. These **are not** likely to be **susceptible to**, say, **a Frankfurt**-**type** account **of freedom, since it will make little sense** in most cases **to speak of** the agents’ **desires (of any order) with respect to** such ﬁne details of **cognition.**16 Again, at the level of normative ethics the utilitarian has a typical strategy for handling these problems—one that can be carried straightforwardly into the epistemic realm. **Since util**itarian value **does not depend on** the formation of **free intentions,** the **util**itarian **can** consistently **deny** the existence of any robust free will, including **doxastic freedom.** The utilitarian also must deny the existence of what we might call “thick” moral responsibility—the moral responsibility of the retributivist, who claims that it can be just to punish even when net consequences of such punishment are bad.17 To the utilitarian, punishment and reward are only justiﬁed, as anything, by its impact on welfare. The utilitarian thus has what we might call a “thin” notion of moral responsibility. Roughly speaking, **for** a **util**itarian **to say someone is responsible** for an outcome **is** just **to say that** the person houses the most appropriate place to apply change in order to bring about more future utility with respect to that outcome. When Squeaky is responsible for murder, this means that efforts to redress current and future such harms are best concentrated on her. Squeaky is not morally responsible in the thick sense for the act; she does not deserve punishment for its own sake. Nonetheless **it can be just to subject her to** isolation and **rehab**ilitation for the sake of future consequences. To the extent we discover that Charlie caused Squeaky to murder, that is the extent to which we discover Charlie is the more effective place to apply such change, and thus in the utilitarian sense we attribute him more of the moral responsibility for the crime.18

Second, reductionism.

Brain studies prove that there’s no such thing as personal identity. **Parfit 84** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[12]](#footnote-12)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

Third, my standard controls the link to any practical reason or contract frameworks because rational agents would consent to a universal law to maximize utility to increase the chance of their own interests being satisfied.

Fourth, the ultimate human good is happiness. **Darwish 09**[[13]](#footnote-13)

Let’s start with knowledge. It is clear that **those who value knowledge for its own sake** (for instance, highly motivated professionals) **find pleasure in** both the **pursuit** and attainment **of knowledge**, however exhausted they become in either case. So, granted that knowledge, for them, is **a value that has intrinsic worth** in itself, and is thus sought for itself, it **is a value that yields** their pleasure or **happiness. The same can be said about** the **other values.** Let’s take autonomy in the sense expressed by Hooker as “control over one’s own life” as another example. Here one needs to say no more than that **the mere fact that people seek autonomy explains** the satisfaction or **the pleasure autonomy brings.** Those who value autonomy, thus seek it for itself, cannot feel happy when their decisions are not in their hands, or when they do not have control over their own life. In short, they cannot be happy otherwise. Moore, who explicitly differs from the classical utilitarians in holding that pleasure is not the sole good, 20 says that “the most valuable things… are pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects,” 21 which seems to mean that such things are valued for the pleasures and the enjoyment they bring. These examples clearly show that **though these values have intrinsic worth, they** bring or **constitute our pleasure.**

Fifth, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90**[[14]](#footnote-14)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

Sixth, util is the only moral system available to policy-makers. **Goodin 90**[[15]](#footnote-15)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty **of a** very **special sort** at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, **[they] are** relatively **poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they** typically **do know are** generalities: **averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people** as a result of their various possible choices, **but that is all. That** is enough to **allow[s]** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

Seventh, conflicting moral side-constraints would paralyze state action, so states must use util to weigh deontological violations.

Eighth, there’s no act-omission distinction. **Gewirth 82** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

**To be responsible for inflicting** lethal **harms, a person need not intend or desire to produce such harms**, either as an end or a means. **It is sufficient if the harms come about as an unintended but foreseeable** and controllable **effect of what he does. For since he knows** or has good reasons to believe **what** **actions** or policies under his control **will lead to the harms in question he can control whether the harms will occur**, so that it is within his power to prevent or at least lessen the probability of their occurrence by ceasing to engage in these actions. Thus, just as all persons have the right to informed control, so far as possible, over the conditions relevant to their incurring cancer and other serious harms, so the causal and moral responsibility for inflicting cancer can be attributed to persons who have informed control over other persons’ suffering the lethal harms of cancer.

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat United States policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 08** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denied access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

Such a model of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

I define rehab as federal support for reentry programs. Prefer this interpretation.

First, it sets the best limits. Here’s a caselist. **Nielson 11** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

Rehabilitation has been considered a primary goal of the prison system throughout the twentieth century, even though it has not been in vogue for many decades (Harvard Law Review, 2010). The debate about rehabilitation has a long, complex history in the US. Bottom line: "Effective programming requires money, effort, and a recommitment to rehabilitation. But it is not only an investment in safe prisons and jails. It is also an investment in safe and healthy communities" (Gibbons & Katzenbach, 2006). Rehabilitation is a critical to overcome the collateral consequences of being a convict which limit the convicted individuals social, economic, and political opportunities after release (Pinard, 2006). If society wants ex-prisoners to succeed, to be rehabilitated, then it has to provide them tools while they are still incarcerated to prepare for the moment of release to reenter society and reenter their families and communities. Reentry begins inside the prison with programs that provide inmates with the stability necessary to transition back into their communities (Muhlhausen, 2010). **Offender reentry programs would be an excellent way to narrow a debate about rehab**ilitation, but before I get to the sorts of affirmative and negative I think are viable under a prison rehabilitation topic, I would like to discuss the benefits of prison reform as a controversy area to the debate community.

**[…]**

The following discussion is focused around mainstream reentry and **rehab**ilitation **programs** which **could be** increased (**created** or expanded) **by Congress.**

**One clear option** for prison reform **is** the improvement of and increase of **education** and training programs. "Prisoners--who are less likely to have completed high school or obtained a General Equivalency Diploma (GED) than the general population--typically enter prison with an educational disadvantage. In fact, there is a direct correlation between a lack of education and the probability of incarceration" (Colgan, 2006). Leaving prison with that same education deficiency has been linked to recidivism; in contrast, educational programs are linked with lowering recidivism (Colgan, 2006). Basic education, vocational programs, & post-secondary education are all possible affirmatives on a prison reform topic (Nixon et al, 2008). Affirmatives may mandate vocational programs offering particular career training to fill holes in the economy (Colgan, 2006). Affirmatives could reform the fees system used by education programs which would encourage enrollment in education programs. **Aff**irmatives **could provide incentives for community college**s to offer **programs for prisoners** to help **with** applications, necessary testing, and **financial aid.**

**Another** affirmative option **is work release**. The unemployment rate for ex-offenders is 33% (Burt, 2010). "There are a number of studies that demonstrate that employment is a fundamental component of the reentry process, and that ex-offenders who are able to find stable employment are much more likely to succeed in their rehabilitation than those who cannot find work" (Nuñez-Neto, 2008). Without income offenders are likely to commit another crime as a means of support (Burt, 2010). "Employment is one of the strongest predictors that an ex-offender will be successful after release and not backslide into crime" (Nuñez-Neto, 2008). If ex-offenders face continual rejection in the labor market, then they are more likely to give up looking for a job and turn to criminal activity to provide an income. Work release allows prisoners to engage in full-time or part-time employment in order to facilitate their re-entry into the labor market after release. Legislation could introduce partnerships between the states Department of Corrections and businesses to provide incentives for businesses to hire prisoners from work release programs post-release (Colgan, 2006). The federal government could also create temporary job programs for ex-prisoners (Burt, 2010).

**Drug** and alcohol **treatment programs** are a practical necessity that many affirmatives could advocate. "Nationally, at least 30 percent of convicted persons report they used illegal drugs at the time of their offense" (Colgan, 2006). Roughly 80% of prisoners report drug use in their history, even if not at the time of the crime (Colgan, 2006). Providing chemical dependency treatment programs would help a large segment of the prison population. The general population believes that putting an addict in prison eliminates their ability to access the substances of their addiction which cures the addiction, but after release without a treatment program many recovering addicts return to substance abuse (Kendrick, 2011). There is solid empirical evidence that ordering inmates into treatment programs and getting them to participate in treatment reduces recidivism (Kendrick, 2011).

**Health** services are a fundamental need in prisons. Health care costs are a huge issue for prison systems and when the state is completely responsible for footing the bill the quality of inmate care may suffer (Quinn, 2009). Inmate health care "is frequently so inadequate that "preventable suffering and death behind bars" has been "normalized" (Dolovich, 2009). There are facilities with four or five thousand prisoners and only three or four doctors and some physicians are limited to work in correctional facilities because they are not qualified to care for the general population (Gibbon & Katzenbach, 2006). Courts have held that inmates have the right to health care, but the quality of the care is still up for debate (Quinn, 2009). 30 states have some form of co-payments for health care required of inmates which discourages prisoners from seeking treatment (Quinn, 2009; Gibbon & Katzenbach, 2006). The Commission on Safety and Abuse in America's Prisons recommends co-pay laws be revoked and Medicaid and Medicare be extended to eligible prisoners (Gibbon & Katzenbach, 2006). Mental health services are desperately needed in prisons. The prevalence of mental illness in prisons is 2 to 4 times higher than that of the general public (Colgan, 2006). Many prisoners do not receive any treatment for mental illness. There is a lack of staffing, medication, and supervision for prisoners with mental illnesses. "The consequences of failing to provide mental health care include suffering, self-mutilation, rage and violence, unnecessary placement in segregation, victimization, and suicide" (Colgan, 2006). The lack of mental health care also poses a risk to inmates who are not ill because inmates with mental illness are more likely to cause disciplinary problems than other inmates. Another significant problem is the inability to reenter society; untreated mental illness makes it more difficult for inmates to become productive, law-abiding citizens (Kendrick, 2011). The most common treatment is segregation which mental health professional argue often worsens the illness (Colgan, 2006). Children **& family services** are an important part of successful rehabilitation. 1.5 million children have parents in the DOC (Colgan, 2006). There is significant evidence about the impact of prisons on family and social networks. Children are taken from parents when they are incarcerated and often there is no visitation once the children are removed. Family structures face intense strain when prisoners reenter the family (Lyles-Chockley, 2009). Parents strain to reconnect with their children and children can go through serious trauma as parents reenter their lives; neither have had a chance to build a relationship during incarceration (Lyles-Chockley, 2009). The racial disparities in incarceration rates have a devastating impact on communities practically dissolving important social networks, particularly in black families (Lyles-Chockley, 2009). There will be affirmatives providing services for prisoners to interact with their children (Colgan, 2006).

**The largest aff** on the topic **would be comprehensive transition**al service programs, which are all in one programs including education, job training and placement, life skills, family reunification services, assistance, chemical dependency treatment, and mental health services (Colgan, 2006). Several states (Tennessee, Hawaii, & New York) have comprehensive programs that could be modeled on a federal level (Colgan, 2006). Holistic reentry services provide for prisoners needs across the board instead of in small pieces. Comprehensive reentry programs recognize the linkages between jobs, education, and social services. "By starting a prisoner with a Plan which identifies all of his or her needs and addresses them holistically, the likelihood of success while in prison and upon release are improved" (Colgan, 2006). In general, access to social services which some are explicitly denied would help convicts overcome significant obstacles to reentry.

Second, debating reentry policies is key to criminal justice education. **Swanson et al 10** writes[[19]](#footnote-19)

**Reentry is an important topic among policy-makers** in national government. It is generally defined as the use of programs, practices, and strategies targeted at promoting the successful reentry of prisoners back into the community Faced with significant numbers of newly released prisoners, including those convicted of serious crimes, the Bush administration created a Prison Reentry Initiative (Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.). Designed as a cooperative effort among several federal agencies, it funds state reentry programs. In addition, Bureau of Justice Assistance grants are awarded to state departments of corrections for developing prerelease services for prisoners transitioning back home. In April, 2008 President Bush also signed the Second Chance Act that creates an interagency council on reentry, provides additional funding for state programs, and authorizes direct grants to non-profit organizations for mentoring and other services for returning adult and juvenile offenders. The 2009 federal budget allocated $25,000,000 for reentry (Browning 2009). The Obama administration has budgeted $100,000,000 for these programs for 2010, a four-fold increase if appropriated (Browning 2009). **Reentry is of consequence for criminal justice education because every facet of the c**riminal **j**ustice **s**ystem, policing, courts, and corrections has contributed to the creation of this problem and **will be affected** by the large numbers of inmates returning from prison. Police will be faced with large numbers of prior offenders who are known to reoffend. The courts will have to deal with the increased work load produced by returning offenders, and ultimately the correctional system will face having to house large numbers of offenders who return to their already overcrowded facilities. Criminal justice education can play a significant role in helping society to come to grips with the legal, political, and public policy issues raised by reentry. **We are** currently **educating the next generation of criminal justice scholars** and practitioners **who will be called upon to provide** the data and **policy initiatives to deal with** the issues raised by **reentry.**

It is our belief that **reentry offers numerous opportunities for research and teaching. There will also be increased opportunities for** bachelor's educated practitioners to **work with the reentry population.** However, working with this population calls for specialized skills tailored to meet the needs of these offenders. Skills related to case management and increased **understanding of substance abuse,** mental illness, housing, **job training,** vocational training, **and education**al opportunities **will be required for** our **students** to take advantage of these opportunities. In addition, there is a need for theoretical understanding of the reentry process as well as knowledge of research methodologies that are helpful for understanding the problem. Legal issues and discretionary decision-making are also relevant to the success of reentry efforts. Will the curriculum in criminal justice education at all levels, but particularly at the undergraduate level, sufficiently prepare students for these new challenges brought about by reentry?

Empirics confirm. Reentry is the most important and least discussed form of criminal justice education. **Swanson et al 10** writes[[20]](#footnote-20)

In this research, **the authors utilize a survey** of members of a national criminal justice organization (Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences) in an effort **to gauge the coverage of reentry** issues **in criminal justice education.** The selection of reentry issues is based on the review of reentry literature. The survey is designed to assess the relative amount of time respondents devote to each topic in fractions of a 16-week semester. The survey was administered electronically through an email link to the instrument. The survey was sent to a total of 1,631 individuals. Thirty-seven were returned as undeliverable or as automated out- of-office replies and another 35 potential participants were bounced out of the survey by the program. A total of 408 respondents completed the survey out of the remaining 1,559 potential participants, resulting in a response rate of 26%. While this response rate is relatively low, web-based surveys commonly result in lower response rates than telephone or male surveys (Couper 2000; DiNitto et al. 2008; Tourangeau 2004). There are several explanations for the relatively low response rate. Recipients included criminal justice educators, practitioners, students, and others interested in criminal justice. The sampling frame does not provide for discerning which recipients teach classes in academic settings. Correspondence from numerous recipients indicates that many members of the national organization do not teach classes. Those individuals who indicated that they did not teach were asked not to complete the survey. In addition, the first two survey questions asked whether the respondent taught in a four- or two-year program, respectively. Only those respondents indicating that they taught in either a four- or two-year program were included in the analysis. Furthermore, the email message introducing the survey identifies its purpose as obtaining information about reentry issues. Return emails from recipients indicates that many of them did not participate because reentry is not their area of interest or expertise. While recipients who showed a reluctance to participate were encouraged to complete the survey, the authors believe that many recipients did not contribute because they felt their responses were not relevant to the research. Thus, it is likely that the results actually overestimate the treatment of reentry issues in criminal justice education due to the self- filtering of many recipients who do not cover such issues in their courses. Those who teach research methods, policing, and courts are possible examples Results Of the 408 respondents, 92.1% indicated that they taught in either a four- or two-year program (see Table 1). Since the focus of this analysis is on criminal justice education, only those respondents indicating that they taught were included in the analysis, resulting in 372 total cases for analysis. Due to the relatively small sample size, pairwise deletion was utilized to maximize the sample size for each analysis. The percentage of cases missing data ranged from 3.2% to 15.6% for the variables used in the analysis. While the missing data produce the potential for biased results, the authors feel that the data provide a solid baseline for this exploratory analysis. The overwhelming majority of respondents, 88.7%, teach in four-year programs. The mean number of majors in their programs is 429 students, with an average of nine faculty members in their departments and average class sizes of 34 students. There is a relatively even split between academic ranks for the respondents: 27.2% hold the rank of professor; 26.2% hold the rank of associate professor; and 32.5% hold the rank of assistant professor. The remaining 15% of respondents are either instructors or adjunct faculty. Nearly three-quarters of the respondents have a PhD, while just over 17% earned their highest degree at the master's level. For the majority of respondents, 55%, their highest degree is in criminal justice, criminology, or justice studies. Seventeen percent hold a degree in sociology, while 14.5% of respondents indicate "other" for their degree field. Open-ended responses indicate that the "other" category primarily includes education, public administration, and psychology. In addition, one-third of respondents designate employment experience in the corrections field. The majority of respondents teach courses in introductory criminal justice and corrections, **while a substantial percentage teach criminology,** policing, **theory, and research** methods courses. **Only 2%** of respondents report **teach**ing **a course on** prisoner **reentry**, while 4% teach a drug-related course. Thus, it appears that when reentry issues are addressed, they are largely covered in more general courses.

**Over 60%** of the respondents **reported that** offender **reentry is** a **very important** topic **in criminal justice education, while another 28% view the topic as important.** Table 2 provides the survey findings for the treatment of numerous reentry issues in criminal justice education. A majority of respondents address 13 of the 14 reentry issues listed. The most commonly covered topics are those involving drug and substance abuse, mental health, and the impact of prisoner reentry on communities with over three-quarters of respondents reporting that they provided some attention to these issues. The least addressed reentry topics are parenting, case management, literacy, and anger issues. Table 3 provides a breakdown of the amount of coverage of each reentry issue for only those respondents who reported they addressed the topics.2 While the previous table shows that a majority of respondents covered reentry issues, the findings in Table 3 indicate that the treatment of those issues with respect to time-frame is very limited. For each issue, **over two-thirds** of the respondents **report** that they provide the **minimum** amount of **coverage**, one to two weeks. Community impact, mental health, and victim issues are most likely to receive additional attention, with over one-third of respondents reporting at least three to four weeks of coverage in their courses.

In an effort to better understand the context under which reentry issues are taught in criminal justice education, a reentry scale was created which measures the overall coverage of all reentry issues. The scale had a range of 1.0 to 5.0, with 1.0 representing no coverage and 5.0 indicating maximum coverage. Means tests were utilized to determine the effects of courses taught, academic rank, and degree field of respondents on reentry coverage. Table 4 reports the findings of the means tests broken down by courses taught. The findings show that those teaching courses on reentry, drug issues, corrections, and theory generally provide the most coverage of reentry issues. There is a significant difference in the amount of attention provided to reentry issues among those who teach these courses and those who do not teach them. This finding is not surprising given the nature of these courses, although our discussion on the relevance of reentry to a variety of topics might provide useful examples of how reentry issues can be more broadly integrated into criminal justice curricula. Tables 5 and 6 display the findings from means tests examining the effects of academic rank and degree field, respectively, on the reentry scale. In most cases, no statistically significant differences were uncovered. However, there is a significant difference in the treatment of reentry subjects by instructors. It appears that instructors cover reentry issues to a greater extent than instructors of other ranks. Perhaps this finding emerges because instructors are more likely to have work experience in the field and are more acutely aware of the importance of reentry issues.3 It is also possible that instructors are more likely to teach courses in which reentry issues are deemed more relevant to the focus of the course. Future research should examine the forces behind this finding. Discussion and Implications The results of the survey provide a positive picture with regard to reentry issues in criminal justice education, yet also indicate several areas for improvement.

Table 6 Comparison of mean level of coverage of reentry issues by degree field

Degree field

CJ/Criminology Other Significance

1.93 1.87 .454

Sociology Other

1.82 1.92 .335

Social work Other

1.81 1.90 .850

Political science Other

1.73 1.91 .245

Law Other

1.61 1.92 .061

The upside is that it appears that reentry issues are being addressed in criminal justice education. Students are exposed to many of the important reentry issues primarily in courses on corrections, drug abuse, and in those few courses offered specifically addressing prisoner reentry. But teachers also address reentry subjects broadly in other courses, often classified as core subjects. Nevertheless, given the implications of the vast numbers of offenders who will be returning to society as a result of decades of punitive crime policies, prisoner reentry arguably could assume greater prominence and more wide- spread coverage in criminal justice education. **While** the findings reported here indicate that **reentry issues are addressed, depth and breadth** of coverage **appear**s to be **lacking** as measured by the amount of time devoted to the subject and the variety of courses in which reentry is addressed. As indicated in Table 4, respondents teaching courses in policing, courts, research and statistics, and introductory criminal justice and criminology are less likely to cover reentry issues. As noted earlier, it can be argued that **the impact of reentry** issues **on all aspects of** the **criminal justice** system **points to a need to cover the topic** in courses in which reentry can be thought of as relevant. Our contention is that reentry is relevant to these courses. The central question, it seems, is this: Is criminal justice education adequately preparing students to address the needs of contemporary criminal justice in practice?

Criminal justice education outweighs other offense. **Nielson 11** writes[[21]](#footnote-21)

Second, **if a large percent**age **of debaters enter** into **law** school, **political science, or social justice** work post their undergraduate studies, **then the prison topic would be valuable** as practical **research for** their **future studies. Debate skills, such as research**, listening, public speaking, personal expression, problem-solving skills, **are highly transferable** in these areas of graduate study. We are all familiar with research indicating **70% of judges recommend** participation in **intercollegiate debate as a precursor to law school** (Freely & Steinberg, 2009). **Debaters** themselves **list law school prep**aration **as one** of the **advantage**s **of** intercollegiate **debate** (Williams, McGee & Worth, 2001). You aren't likely go to law school and skip over a discussion of the penal system. **The debate community has an opportunity to prepare** our undergraduates **for** work in **a field they are most likely to go into.**

Third, extinction. Debating specific nuclear scenarios is key to stave off actual nuclear war.

**Harvard Nuclear Study Group 83** writes[[22]](#footnote-22)

The question is grisly, but nonetheless it must be asked. **Nuclear war cannot be avoided** simply **by refusing to think about it.** Indeed the task of **reducing** the likelihood of **nuclear war should begin with** an effort to **understand[ing] how it might start. When strategists in Washington** or Moscow **study** the possible origins of **nuclear war, they discuss “scenarios,”** imagined sequences of future events that could trigger the use of nuclear weaponry. Scenarios are, of course, speculative exercises. They often leave out the political developments that might lead to the use of force in order to focus on military dangers. That nuclear war scenarios are even more speculative than most is something for which we can be thankful, for it reflects humanity’s fortunate lack of experience with atomic warfare since 1945. But imaginary as they are, **nuclear scenarios can help identify problems not understood or dangers not yet** prevented because they have not been **foreseen.**

4. Textuality. “Resolved” means a policy.

**Words and Phrases 64** writes[[23]](#footnote-23)

**Definition of** the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

“Ought” can only refer to action, even in the context of “ought to be.”

**Prichard 12** writes[[24]](#footnote-24)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone.** The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to say that the world or something in it is not what it **ought to be, what we really mean is** that God or **some human** being has not made something what he **ought to have made it**. And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that we can only feel the imperativeness upon us of something which is in our power; **for** it is actions and **actions alone** which, directly at least, **are in our power.**

5. Case is a disad to theory. Pell Grants discourse is key to real world reform.

**Abdul-Alim 12** writes[[25]](#footnote-25)

John J. Farmer, Jr., former New Jersey attorney general and now **Dean** and Professor **of Law at** the **Rutgers** School of Law, **called** the restoration of **Pell grants for prisoners “one of the most important dialogues we can have in** the context of **law enforcement.”** “I think that education in our prisons is the key to preventing recidivism,” Farmer said. Farmer made his remarks Thursday at the Rutgers University Paul Robeson Campus Center during an event titled “Pell Grants and Prison Education: How Pell Grant Access in Prison Transforms Lives.” Among those who spoke in support of lifting the ban on Pell grants to prisoners was Dallas Pell, daughter of the late U.S. Sen. Claiborne Pell, father of Pell grants. Pell, who is founder of an organization called Pell Grants for Public Safety, said providing education for individuals in prison is a “no-brainer” and “one of the most effective tools we have to make our community safe.” Pell and various speakers noted how a plethora of studies have repeatedly found that higher education for prisoners significantly reduces their likelihood of returning to prison. Indeed, a 2005 Institute for Higher Education report, titled “Learning to Reduce Recidivism,” noted how “research consistently demonstrates that participation in educational programs while incarcerated reduces recidivism rates by increasing an individual’s ability to successfully rejoin mainstream society upon release from prison.” The paper also recommends restoration of Pell grants for prisoners. While academic support for education in correctional settings is easy to find, political will to lift the federal ban on Pell grants to prisoners has been more difficult to garner. **Farmer** said toward the end of his stint as New Jersey Attorney General from 1999 to 2002, he **tried to sponsor legislation** that would provide for increased educational opportunities for prisoners in order to make it easier for them to reenter society. “At the time **there** just **was no traction** among the political people to pass legislation like this,” Farmer said. The group that organized Thursday’s discussion – **The E**ducation from the **I**nside **O**ut Coalition – has faced similar challenges. Over the past few years, the organization has **approached key members of Congress** and, more recently, officials at the U.S. Department of Education in an attempt to get them **to reverse the** 1994 **ban** on Pell grants for incarcerated individuals. Each time, those involved in the effort say, they leave the table with the idea that **they must first build** broad **public support before any official will take the issue on.**

Pell Grants are fair.

1. Wiki solves predictability. It’s the TOC. You’ve had 5 months to cut cards.

2. Pell grants are the core of the topic. They’re the primary obstacle to education in the squo. That’s Buzzini 9.

3. Pell grants are the only federal education aff. Any other interp forces me to defend simultaneous 50 state action or private actor fiat which is bad because it’s utopian and not real world. Also kills my ground since no one in the lit defends simultaneous 50 state action. This also proves I create small limits for the topic.

4. Default to field context to determine T violations. That determines whether the plan is in the lit base. I meet. Pell grants are considered rehab in the lit, and the ban on Pell grants is retributive – that’s Buzzini 9.

5. Plans are key to stable advocacy so neg can’t moot the AC with definitional tricks.

6. Whole rez is incoherent. The state can’t use every competing rehab policy on every prisoner.

7. Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[26]](#footnote-26)

**AFC preserves the value of the [1AC]** first affirmative constructive speech. **This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

Gut check against dumb theory. Competing interps creates a race to the bottom where every round comes down to theory. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates.

Err Aff on theory. This topic is moving towards massive neg bias. Neg won 30% more rounds at NDCA two weeks ago, including all but 1 elim.

Err against debaters who don’t disclose. It gives me an infinite research burden which kills fairness and pre-round topic education.

Err towards small schools on theory to account for resource disparity that makes it harder for me to win.

## 1AR

1. Extinction first. It precludes all sentiments.

2. No impact to moral motivation in the context of government. It’s not an agent with motivation.

3. No impact to moral semantics. If the common usage of “morality” was defined as “genocide”, that wouldn’t make it good. Language doesn’t guide action.

4. Rationality is the natural aspiration of human beings. We’re motivated to act morally, not emotionally. **Korsgaard 2** writes[[27]](#footnote-27)

C.M.K.: **I would not** quite **say that the account of moral motivation only works if we assume that people are rational. Rather,** I would say that **there is a descriptive sense in which people have no choice but to be rational** and to act on reasons of some kind. **Rationality** in this descriptive sense **is forced upon us by the fact that we are self-conscious beings and can act on our incentives only if we take them to be reasons.** So there is no question of acting rationally versus not acting rationally. There is only a question whether our reasons are good ones or bad ones, whether we are rational in a normative sense. (And of course there is the precedent question whether we can derive some standard for reasons being good or bad ones, such as the Formula of Humanity in the argument I described before.) So I don’t think that **I am [not] making a strong presupposition of rationality in the normative sense. It is more a thesis in moral psychology.**

5. Use extinction as a meta-standard to resolve moral uncertainty. **Bostrom 2** writes[[28]](#footnote-28)

These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest[s]** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. **[that] We may not** now **know**—at least not in concrete detail—**what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity;** we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then **we should recognize that there is** a **great option value in preserving**—and ideally improving—**our ability to recognize value and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value.**

6. Gut check aff if you like rehab. Under her framework, you can’t be wrong.

7. Punishment makes criminals sad; that’s a negative emotion.

8. No link. Pell Grants don’t affect sentencing.

9. TURN – Rehab is key to sympathy. **Clark 3**[[29]](#footnote-29)

But Moore recognizes that retributive emotions often compete against other responses when we think about criminal offenders. We may find, for instance, that when we consider the tough circumstances of some criminals, we are moved to sympathy, a **sympathy** that **might offset** to some extent the desire to impose suffering on the offender. Why shouldn’t sympathy mitigate the degree of **retribution** sought? Doesn’t it too reflect some sort of moral reality? If so, **might it not suggest** other responses to crime, such as **rehab**ilitation, restitution, and addressing the multiple criminogenic factors revealed by behavioral science**?** To secure retribution’s pride of place, Moore adduces two considerations against this line of argument. First, it is only virtuous emotions, he says, which we should generally rely upon as heuristic guides to moral reality: "…in ethics we should recognize that the virtue of (or vice) of an emotion may often, but not always, be taken as an indication of the truth (or falsity) of the judgment to which it leads" (137). Second, in developing an overall theory of justice, he explicitly adopts a "coherentist" approach, in which the theory seeks maximum overall consistency among our intuitions and judgments. (This approach differs, for instance, from a foundationalist approach in which certain first principles have privileged status and form the basis from which the rest of the theory is derived.) Combining these two desiderata, the way we decide which of our conflicting moral intuitions should be kept and which should be discarded to achieve coherence, is to see which are based in virtuous emotions. Virtue works as a guide to coherence. Unsurprisingly, Moore argues the case that retributive emotions, at least some of them, are virtuous, while the sympathy we feel for certain offenders is not. Thus we can safely discard our errant sympathies, what Moore calls "moral hallucinations" (132) since they distort our view of moral reality, and hew to the retributive imperative. But whether we agree with Moore about all this hinges on whether 1) we agree with Moore’s claims about the virtue and theoretical probity of retributive versus sympathetic emotions, and 2) whether we agree that maximum coherence should be the driving feature of a true theory of justice. I shall contest both these claims. Moore, very much to his credit, bends over backwards to present the strongest case against the virtue of retributive emotions, which he then tries to rebut in the chapter entitled "The Moral Worth of Retribution". He candidly admits that retribution is often motivated by what Nietzsche described with the word ressentiment. Moore defines ressentiment as "a witches’ brew: resentment, fear, anger, cowardice, hostility, aggression, cruelty, sadism, envy, jealousy, guilt, self-loathing, hypocrisy and self-deception" (120). Moore says "It may well be that insofar as the retributive urge is based on such emotions as these…the urge is bad for us" (125). But, he points out, there are also virtuous emotions which ground retribution, namely the "moral outrage" that often is inspired by witnessing or contemplating flagrant acts of wrongdoing that cause suffering, and the often appropriate sense of guilt when we ourselves do something wrong. In both cases, we might feel that retributive punishment is fairly imposed on the offender, that it is deserved, whether the offender be someone else or ourselves. Not to feel these emotions, Moore says, is to be morally defective, and the virtue of such feelings is evidence for the truth of retributivism, since virtuous feelings come with "good epistemic credentials" (147). As Moore says about guilt: "Our feelings about guilt thus generate a judgment that we deserve the suffering that is punishment. If the feelings of guilt are virtuous to possess, we have reason to believe that this last judgment is correct, generated as it is by emotions whose epistemic import is not in question" (148). It is this intuition of desert, generated by guilt and moral outrage, Moore says, that makes it not only permissible to punish wrongdoers, but that makes it morallyrequired to punish them, even if no other desirable outcomes follow from retribution (148, 154). So although retribution may indeed sometimes be inspired by despicable motives and emotions, for Moore that doesn’t undercut its valid basis in some virtuous moral sentiments. Assuming for the moment that Moore has indeed demonstrated the virtue and reality-revealing nature of some retributive emotions, what about sympathy, e.g., "the **sympathy we may feel for wrongdoers whose wrongdoing was caused by** factors such as **social adversity or psychological abuse during childhood**"?Moore writes: "There are three things to say about this range of moral experience. First, the moral judgment it seems to support does not fit with the much larger set of judgments about responsibility that we make in daily life. In seeking the most coherent expression of our moral judgements considered as a whole, these sympathetic judgements may simply have to be discarded. No area of human knowledge is perfectly coherent. Any systematic exposition of our sensory experience, for example, has to disregard certain visual experiences because they give us inaccurate information about the world…The same can be said of our sympathetic responses to disadvantaged criminals" (544, my emphasis). In other words, to minimize conflict in our judgments, we must disregard the sympathies generated by the adversities undergone by offenders. Such sympathies are inconsistent with our more numerous and powerful retributive inclinations, and furthermore they are "inaccurate" in some sense. On the face of it, this seems arbitrary, to say the least. Conflict between retributive feelings, even virtuous ones, and sympathetic feelings (which at least initially seem virtuous) may simply reflect a real moral conflict, and to discount one side of the conflict in order to preserve theoretical coherence might well compromise theoretical accuracy. We may well have both feelings about an offender (if not simultaneously, at least in succession), both of which reflect sets of circumstances that pertain to the case. Moore’s comparison of sympathetic feelings to inaccurate visual information assumes that our sympathy is somehow misplaced, but of course he has to prove this. Secondly, and in response to just this point, Moore goes on to say, "…just as we discount our experience with sticks looking bent when immersed in water because we can explain the experience away, so we should discount any sympathy for disadvantaged criminals if we can explain why we feel that sympathy in terms of extraneous factors." Moore suggests two such factors: "our own guilt at not having done enough to alleviate ‘unhappy’ causes of crime, or…our sense that those who became criminals because of adverse circumstances have ‘already suffered enough’" (545). But even if we discount these causes of sympathy as extraneous, surely there are others that are not. Contemplating the chaotic, punitive and often dangerous conditions that disadvantaged offenders grow up in often generates sympathetic compassion, for indeed **were any of us raised in those conditions, we** too **would be more likely [to] suffer the same criminal fate.** Putting ourselves in the disadvantaged shoes of an offender should inspire sympathy, for if it does not, then we are supposing that we would have been immune to the influences that shaped her. From a naturalistic perspective, which Moore shares, in which human beings are determined by environment (as well as heredity), such a supposition is clearly false, and the lack of sympathy it generates is a clear moral defect. Such **sympathy may not outweigh** feelings of **outrage, but it nevertheless** reflects circumstances as real as the crime committed, and so **is not a "moral hallucination"** on a par with the bent stick illusion. [2](http://www.naturalism.org/criminal.htm#Note2) Third and lastly, Moore says about sympathy that "..we have reason to discount certain experiences and the intuitions they generate when, on examination, their appearance of moral goodness proves deceptive" (545). Moore goes on to speculate that our sympathies for disadvantaged offenders might be due not to any laudable variety of compassion, but to unconscious feelings of superiority to the offender, or perhaps the elitist refusals to judge others by the standards we impose on ourselves or to acknowledge the moral dignity and autonomy of others (546). If these were the only source of our sympathy, then its moral goodness (and epistemic credentials) would be put in question, but since there is another robust source, the compassion described above, its goodness stands unchallenged. This point is the same Moore himself makes about the sources of retributive judgements: some sources are morally dubious, but since others have merit, retribution survives in his theory. So, even by Moore’s own criterion of moral virtue, sympathy passes muster, and thus it seems we might concede it a role in a theory of criminal justice and in the disposition of criminal cases. To recap: to achieve a maximally coherent theory of criminal law, Moore wants us to jettison our sympathetic responses to disadvantaged criminals. This would give retribution freer reign, no doubt simplifying the mission of criminal justice. We should discount sympathy because it is morally hallucinatory (it doesn’t accurately represent moral reality, just as a bent stick in water doesn’t accurately represent the true physical state of the stick) and because its sources are morally dubious. I think Moore is mistaken on all counts. In reverse order, it appears that sympathy can be morally good, that is, it can stem from what we acknowledge is a moral virtue, namely compassion. Second, such sympathy accurately reflects a significant aspect of moral reality, namely the punitive and distressing conditions associated with increased criminality. To ignore such conditions and the compassion they inspire is to give short shrift to an important dimension of our moral universe. Third, we cannot, on grounds of seeking coherence, simply dispense with **sympathy** as an emotional outlier when forming judgements about criminal offenses. Rather, it **justifiably competes with our retributive inclinations.** This theory isn’t as clean as Moore’s, but it does better justice, I submit, to the often ambiguous and conflicting moral reality we inhabit.

Sympathy comes first under sentimentalism. **Landow 12**[[30]](#footnote-30)

According to [Samuel Johnson](http://www.victorianweb.org/previctorian/johnson/sjov.html)'s Dictionary (1755), **sympathy is defined as** "fellow-feeling; mutual sensibility; **the quality of being affected by the** affections [**feelings**] **of another.**"More than one hundred years later, [John Ruskin,](http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/ruskin/ruskinov.html) the great Victorian critic of art and society, similarly explained that sympathy, "the imaginative understanding of the natures of others, and the power of putting ourselves in their place, is the faculty on which virtue depends" (Fors Clavigera, 1873). During the second half of the eighteenth century and throughout most of the nineteenth, sympathy, which today signifies little more than compassion or pity, was a word of almost magical significance that described a particular mixture of emotional perception and emotional communication. **Johnson and Ruskin derived** their ideas of **sympathy from** a British school of moral **philosophy that referred ethics to feelings** in a radical manner, one that eventually caused fundamental changes in politics, culture, religion, and conceptions of human nature**.** This **sentimentalist** or emotionalist school of **ethics**, which provided an important part of the foundations of both [Romanticism](http://www.victorianweb.org/previctorian/misc/romanticov.html) and the [French Revolution](http://www.victorianweb.org/history/hist7.html), developed in response to the English [empiricists](http://www.victorianweb.org/philosophy/phil3.html) Thomas Hobbes and [John Locke](http://www.victorianweb.org/philosophy/locke1.html). 1. Locke claimed that we have no innate ideas of good and evil. 2. In an attempt to find another basis for arguments that men and women were moral beings, Thomas Burnett and Anthony Cooper, [Lord Shaftesbury](http://www.victorianweb.org/history/shaftesb.html), founders of this new school of moral philosophy, replaced innate ideas with emotional reactions, thought with emotion. Extending Locke's own notion that the mind has an innate power or principle that perceives differences in color, Burnett suggested that a similar power perceives differences in moral value. Shaftesbury, the more influential of the two, then argued that we have an internal moral sense much like the senses of sight, hearing, and taste. 3. The Scottish school of emotionalist moral philosophers -- [Adam Smith](http://www.victorianweb.org/economics/smith.html) (better known now for his economics), Dugald Stewart, and Thomas Reid -- **identified****the moral sense with the imagination, whose job it is to make us feel the effects upon others of our actions.** In other words, the **sympathetic imagination**, as it was called, **provides the psychological** mechanism of the **Golden Rule**: we do not steal from others because our imagination projects us into their vantage point (into their minds), and we thus experience how it would feel

10. TURN – Rehab is more consistent with our emotions than retribution. Studies prove. **Petersen et al. 12**[[31]](#footnote-31)

6.2. Results Does perceived association value predict preferences for reparative over punitive sanctions? Yes. As shown in the bottom right of Fig. 4, the perceived association value influences the choice between a reparative over a punitive strategy (odds ratio=11.81, p=.03, one-tailed). The odds ratio of 11.81 implies that a change in the **perceived association value** of the criminal from the variable's minimum value (0) to its maximum value (1) **makes it 11**.81 **times more likely that the subject will choose a reparative rather [than] punitive sanction.** This finding replicates the relationship between association value and reparative preferences found in Study 1 while measuring association value as expectations of becoming a productive member of society rather than expectations of committing crimes in the future. Furthermore, as shown in Fig. 4, **crime seriousness did not have a significant effect** (odds ratio=0.25, p=0.49). 2 In the online supplemental materials, it is demonstrated that the recidivism and productivity measures are highly correlated (and likely track the same underlying psychological variable) and the effects reported here are replicated using a scale combining the two measures. -.15\* 11.81\* (odds ratio) .48\*\*\* -.08 Intensity of sanction Preference for reparative over punitive sanctions Criminal’s association value Crime seriousness Criminal shows remorse, lacks criminal record and has a job -.04 .13\*\* .25 (odds ratio) 1.29 (odds ratio) Fig. 4. Study 2 (battery): perceived seriousness of crime and perceived association value of the criminal as mediators of cues to association value. Unstandardized regression coefficients (b) and odds ratios calculated using binary logistic regression. All variables are coded between 0 and 1. M.B. Petersen et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior xx (2012) xxx–xxx 11**Do cues of remorse**, lack of criminal record, and employment **contribute** more strongly **to perceptions of association value** than to perceptions of the seriousness of his crime**? Yes.** As shown in the left side of Fig. 4, variation in information about the criminal had a significant effect on perceptions of his association value (b= 0.13, p=.005, one-tailed), but no effect on how serious his crime was seen to be (r=−0.04, p=.25, one-tailed). The effect of the cues on perceived association value was three times greater than their effect on the perceptions of the crime's seriousness. To test whether these cues affect the preference for a reparative over a punitive sanction indirectly, through their effects on perceptions of the criminal's association value, we performed a formal mediation test suited for binary dependent variables (Stata FAQ 2012). We find that perceived association value does significantly and fully mediate the effect of the experimentally varied cues on sanctioning preference.3 Does the perceived seriousness of the crime predict the preferred intensity of the sanction? Yes. As shown in the top left of Fig. 4, the preferred intensity of sanction was predicted by both the perceived seriousness of the crime (r= 0.48, pb.001, one-tailed) and perceptions of the criminal's association value (r=−0.15, p=.03, one-tailed), but the effect size for seriousness was more than three times larger than for association value. These results provide strong further support for the recalibrational theory counterexploitation. We were able to replicate the core findings from Study 1 in a different country using a benefit-oriented measure of association value—one that does not tap expectations about future criminal activities— and a more demanding measure of reparative preferences. 7. Discussion Extending extant research on lay intuitions about criminal justice, we have demonstrated that individuals spontaneously compute an index of the criminal's association value and that this value regulates the motivation to repair the criminal or punish him. **Across a range of** different **types of crime and** across two highly different countries (**the U**nited **S**tates **and Denmark**)**, subjects' preferences for rehab**ilitation **over punishment were regulated by** their **perceptions of the criminal, independently of** their perceptions of **the crime.** The seriousness of the crime, as judged by the subjects, did not regulate their preferences for repair over punishment for violent crimes. **The effect of seriousness** on reparative sentiments **was significant only for** the vignette describing a nonviolent crime, **vandalism; even so, its effect size was only half that for** the criminal's **association value.** The seriousness of the crime, in contrast, regulated the intensity of preferred sanctions far more than perceptions of the criminal did. A person's association value is an estimate of how likely that person is to exploit (or confer benefits) on you and those you care about in the future. We experimentally manipulated several ancestrally valid cues to association value: the offender's criminal history, the offender's status as an ingroup or out-group member, and the offender's expression of remorse. The results confirmed that these cues have a major effect on the computation of a criminal's association value but little or no effect on computations of the crime's seriousness. As previous studies have shown, the seriousness of the crime seems instead to be computed primarily on the basis of the costs the crime imposes on others (see online supplemental materials, available on the journal's website at www.ehbonline.org). These results support the hypothesis that the mind's design for deciding how to respond to criminals (exploiters) has two distinct information processing channels, which use two distinct sets of cues to compute two different decision variables: the criminal's association value and the seriousness of the crime. In sum, these results show that **while a crime's** indexed **seriousness regulates how much to react,** the criminal's indexed **association value regulates the more fundamental decision of** how to react (i.e., **whether we want to punish or rehab**ilitate)**.**

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    Jamaal spends countless hours playing chess at various parks in major U.S. cities and on-line with people from around the world. He has travelled extensively, including to Morocco, Argentina, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Jamaal covers college and careers through a Gates Foundation grant.) “Exploring the Use of Pell Grants To Go From Prison to College.” 10 December 2012. <http://www.youthtoday.org/view_article.cfm?article_id=5729> [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
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